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EARL WARREN: MASTER OF THE REVELS
EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE. By G. Edward White. 1 New
York: Oxford University Press. 1982. Pp. x, 429. $25.00.
2
Reviewed by Philip B. Kurland

"the master of the revels, if so, without disrespect, I may characterize the judge presiding on the bench." B. Cardozo, Law and
Literature 15o (i931).

Although the biography of a judge ought to concern ideas
rather than deeds, intellectual biography is a difficult literary
form to manage well. Ideas are fleeting and difficult to capture, however well documented in legal opinions they may
seem. And few judicial biographers successfully elucidate the
ideological foundations of their subjects' actions. Instead, just
as the judges they write about generally reason from ends to
means, the biographers tend to explain ideas as an outgrowth
of deeds rather than to explore how deeds derive from ideas.
Intellectual biography proves less difficult when the subject
is an intellectual. The typical Supreme Court Justice, however
-

even the incomparable John Marshall -

is not an intellec-

tual. He has not risen to the High Court because of reknown
as a deep thinker. More often the appointment either rewards
political activity in government or in bar association activities
or follows from predictions, however faulty, of steadfastness
to the appointing power's political notions of the judicial function. Perhaps for this reason, judicial biography is often political rather than intellectual.
Political biography inevitably invokes the partisanship of
the author so that the subject becomes the protagonist - or

I Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
2 William R. Kenan Jr. Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago.
3 One must look to the two volumes on Holmes by the late Mark DeWolfe Howe
as the ideal, perhaps the unique example of great judicial biography. See M. HOWE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, VOLUME I, THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-1870
(i957); id., VOLUME 2, THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882 (1963). But then, Holmes

left a legacy of records of his thinking and its development, particularly involving the
period before his accession to the bench, the period covered by Howe's work. Holmes
came to maturity in a community that highly valued intelligence and intellect. Certainly no judicial figure before or since has had a tutor like Ralph Waldo Emerson,
a father with the wit and wisdom of the senior Holmes, or close friends of the mental
caliber of William and Henry James or the Adams brothers. Certainly none has
written as important a jurisprudential tome before donning his judicial robes. See
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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occasionally the villain - of the story that unfolds. 4 The most
attractive aspect of Professor G. Edward White's book is that
the author does not conceal his partisanship. The book
avowedly adopts the tone of a brief, an argument to salvage
a reputation that the author believes to have been unfairly
diminished in the decade since Warren's death. It is, moreover, to Professor White's credit that, unlike those who propose their judicial subjects for sainthood, he leaves no ground
for the devil's advocate. He adheres with scrupulous fairness
to the facts, however unpersuasive some biased readers may
find his inferences. In addition, he writes with considerable
literary skill. Clearly this book merits attention: it is honest
and eminently readable. Whether it is also cogent may depend
rather on the perspective of the reader than on that of the
author.
To most legal academicians, the true believers in the Warren myth,5 the book will prove supererogative. Both before
and after they read it, they will know that Warren is the
greatest or second greatest judge in American history, depending on where they rank John Marshall. Whether the book will
persuade those with no preconceptions or knowledge of the
subject matter is difficult to say: given White's ratiocinations,
the greatness of the late Chief Justice should clearly shine
forth. As for those of us who never regarded Earl Warren or
the Court over which he presided with adequate Christian
charity, 6 the book will not shake our belief in the stereotype
that White seeks to destroy. White might have persuaded
Warren's detractors of their error if he revealed new facts. He
does not. Instead, he attempts to show that the stereotype
depends on erroneous inferences.
The stereotype that White would dispel is, he admits,
partly of Warren's own making:
He was, according to this opinion, a relatively simple man
who happened to occupy a number of visible positions; a
person of ordinary intellectual talents, of relatively bland disposition, and of limited horizons whose success, paradoxically,
4 There are of course exceptions, but they are few. David Cecil's biography of
Melbourne is one. See D. CECIL, MELBOURNE (1954). But it was probably less
difficult for a Cecil to regard political controversies coolly, and it is always easier for
an author to be detached from an historical figure than from a contemporary one.
5 Examples include Yale Law Professor Fred Rodell and those who responded to
a questionnaire about Warren that White cites (pp. 3o5-06).
6 See, e.g., P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT

(197o); Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term - Foreword: "Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78
HARv. L. REv. 143 (1964).
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may be attributable to no more than the fact that he was
''average."
Warren himself contributed to this stereotype. . . . His
public speeches, throughout his career, tended to be ponderous
and wooden; neither humor nor pithiness was his forte. Nor
was his conversation vivid: He was neither a raconteur nor a
wit, he did not enjoy pointed analysis or gossip. (Pp. 3-4).
For most of us, this description of Warren's public persona
also characterizes Warren the man. White has omitted one
important trait from his sketch, however - the pervasive sin
of vanity. Warren was extraordinarily vain. He saw all who
opposed or criticized him as, at best, guilty of lMse majestM
and, at worst, tools of the devil. And to be sure, no signs of
Warren's humility appear anywhere in this book. But then,
no humble man has ever risen to the post of Chief Justice of
the United States. A man of humility would find it difficult
to flourish in that office.
Justice Frankfurter, who became Earl Warren's principal
bite noir, has said: "The true face even of a public man is his
private face. That can be seen only off stage, in the manner
in which he pursues his tasks, day by day, when only those
'7
in close association see and hear and feel what he is doing."
But, as the subtitle of the White volume reveals, the author
does not attempt to uncover Warren's private "persona."
Rather, he makes three particular arguments that, in good
Supreme Court tradition, he summarizes at the beginning:
There are three assumptions . . . that this book seeks to
challenge. The first is that Warren was a conservative California politician; I shall suggest that neither the term "conservative" nor the term "politician" accurately describes Warren's career as a California public official. The second is that
Warren underwent a marked change in his attitudes once on
the Supreme Court. I shall argue that his public life can be
seen as of a piece and that the surface contradictions in his
thought can be seen as manifestations of a deep commitment
to a general set of principles that were consistent in themselves. The third is that Warren was not a legal technician
and that his jurisprudential views were largely derivative. I
shall contend that Warren was merely a different kind of legal
technician, unorthodox rather than inept, and that his theory
of judging, while uniquely his, was not without its own theoretical integrity. (P. 4).
Of the three arguments, the least interesting is White's
challenge to Warren's reputation as a "conservative politician."
7 Frankfurter, The Impact of Charles Evans Hughes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON
THE SUPREME COURT 465 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
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Neither the adjective 8 nor the noun contributes much to behavioral definition. Theodore White has recently pointed out
that, ever since Hiram Johnson led the Progressive revolution
in California during the first half of the century, politics there
have differed greatly from the Eastern variety. 9 Thus, that
Earl Warren was clearly not a "conservative" in comparison
with his chief California opponents in his quest for the Presidency - Richard Nixon, Goodwin Knight, and William F.
Knowland - may reflect more on the peculiarities of Warren's
political environment than on his proper place on the national
ideological spectrum.
White also fails to meet his burden of persuasion that
Warren was not a politician. Warren managed to put together
shifting blocks of constituencies, sometimes supported by political and private figures of dubious integrity, in order to have
spent his entire pre-judicial career in appointed or elected
office. Unlike his predecessor, Governor Olson, Warren was
not an innovator in state government. Rather, like Thomas
Dewey of New York, he sought to build a base for higher
office in each of those that he occupied. And although his
commitment to Dwight Eisenhower at the 1952 Republican
Convention might have reflected a principled choice for middie-of-the-road over conservative Republicanism, it also became Warren's last hurrah as a candidate for public office,
and he made the most of it.
Although both Warren and Eisenhower denied that any
bargain was struck at the 1952 Republican Convention, few
doubt that Warren exchanged the California delegation, whose
vote cost him as well as Robert Taft the possibility of the
Presidency, for the promise of the judicial chair that he came
to occupy. 10 Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney General, reported that "Warren 'took the position ...

that he was

8 Ambrose Bierce defined a conservative as "[a] statesman who is enamored of
existing evils, as distinguished from the Liberal, who wishes to replace them with
others." A. BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY (i9o6).
9 T. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT,
1956-i980, at 63-71 (1982).
10 See, e.g., J. WEAVER, WARREN 183 (1967). Weaver claims:

When Warren's appointment to the Court was represented in the press as the
payment of a political debt incurred at the Republican convention, Eisenhower

was deeply offended. Like a pregnant spinster decrying the notion that sex
might have had something to do with her condition, the General seemed to
resent any carnal suggestion that politics had played a part in placing him in
the White House.
Id.; cf. L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN 302-10 (1967) (attributing appointment more to

Eisenhower's gratitude for Warren's campaign support in late 1952 and to Eisenhower's desire to appoint a moderate Western Republican than to a convention bargain
for the California delegation).
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ready to accept the Chief Justiceship,

.

.. that he did feel that

he had a commitment for the next vacancy, and that this was
the next vacancy"' (p. 15o).11

It makes little difference to Warren's reputation, however,
whether White proves that Warren was neither a conservative
nor a politician. Even if he were a liberal statesman committed to the needs of the people rather than to the advancement
of his own career, few prosecutors, governors, or unsuccessful
presidential candidates leave a mark on history. Warren is no
exception. His legacy will depend on his actions as Chief
Justice.
White's second argument is equally irrelevant to Warren's
place in history. That Warren "underwent a marked change
in his attitudes once on the Supreme Court" (p. 4) cannot
detract from the credit due him for his work as a Chief Justice.
White himself appears to acknowledge that different offices
require different stances:
As a member of the University of California's Board of Regents, Warren had consistently voted against the imposition
of a loyalty oath on university faculty and staff, but as governor he had called a special session of the California legislature in September, 1950 to institute an oath for all state
employees, knowing that this oath would be applied against
University of California personnel. (P. 242).
Moreover, White cannot controvert the inconsistencies that
pervade Warren's career. Warren's attitudes toward criminal
procedure seemed to have taken a i8o-degree turn between
his prosecutorial and his judicial days. Suggesting that it takes
a thief to catch a thief, some have noted that his early experience as a district attorney alerted Warren to the abuses of
that office. 12 White offers a different explanation, which, however, is no more reassuring:
The professional criminal of the Prohibition era, Warren believed, knew what he was doing and took his chances; the
average Warren Court criminal, he thought, might have
turned to crime because of disadvantage or out of degradation.
11 White concludes: "On balance, Brownell's account of the conversation between
himself and Warren seems authentic" (p. is).
12

Lloyd Jester, who had worked for Warren in the Alameda County District
Attorney's Office, said that Warren's protective attitude toward criminals as a
judge was in direct response to his awareness of the coercive powers of an
ambitious prosecutor. When Warren became Chief Justice, Jester claimed, "he
just plain assumed that every other district attorney, every other prosecutor in
this land of ours acted and was acting in the same manner in which he himself
had acted in the past .... [H]e just turned turtle, 'cause he was going to
correct all of these ills." (P. 264).
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One could even see "street crime" in the fifties and sixties as
a protest against inequality and disadvantage in American
life: a desparate plea to be able to participate fully in American society. Although the Court could do nothing about the
deplorable conditions of urban America, it could at least ensure that the process of criminal justice did not add to the
degraded status of those participating in it. (P. 265).
This statement, of course, does not claim that Warren's early
and later positions were consistent, but rather explains why
they were not. Nor can White reconcile inconsistent responses
to the issue of reapportionment, vetoed by Governor Warren
but extolled by Chief Justice Warren:
The Brown case and the changes that it brought about caused
many people to believe that it was the most important case
of my tenure on the Court. That appraisal may be correct,
but I have never thought so. It seemed to me that accolade
should go to the case of Baker v. Carr (1962), which was the
progenitor of the "one man, one vote" rule. 13
Warren's pervasive antiracism on the Court, from Brown
onward, contrasts sharply with his role in the forced removal
of Japanese from the West Coast in 1942. Here, White offers
no apologies. "Warren was one of the individuals most responsible for bringing the relocation program into being ...
[A]mong Warren's motives for excluding the Japanese from
California was a provincial, xenophobic racism" (pp. 74-75).
Indeed, White discounts the sincerity of Warren's published
recantation. The only excuse implied is Warren's good company in the decision - President Roosevelt, Walter Lippmann,
and the Justices of the Supreme Court majority that sustained
the constitutionality of the relocation. (It is a bit disingenuous,
though, to equate the Court's upholding of the Army regulations' constitutionality with Warren's political approval of their
enactment.) In any event, White does not demonstrate any
ideological continuity between the early Warren and the Chief
Justice of the United States. This inconsistency, attorney Warren's excessively vigorous prosecution of the Point Lobos case,
and his barbarous crusade against Professor Max Radin's appointment to the California Supreme Court (pp. 6, 34-35, 6769, 73-77, 81, 103, 107, 126, 162, 267, 280, 319-20) simply
figure as black spots on the escutcheon that mar the image of
Warren that White would ask history to accept.
White suggests here, however, a different kind of consistency, which derives from the differences in the legal contexts
13 E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
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of Warren's earlier and later judgments. The answers Warren
proffered suited their occasion. As White would have it, then,
constitutional protections are appropriately expanded to protect rapists, murderers, and muggers but should remain unavailable to bootleggers, rum runners, and organized corrupters of politicians. (Why drug peddlers should be in the former
category and not the latter may not be so clear to some.)
Perhaps Warren sought to protect the rugged individualist
against corporate enterprise even in the administration of the
criminal laws.
But why should it matter whether Warren as executive was
consistent with Warren as judge? Surely differences in perspectives between the judicial function and the executive function are justified. Perhaps White fears that "psychohistorians"
may rely on ideological inconsistencies to conjure theories of a
"neurotic-narcissistic personality" derived from childhood insecurities and to conclude that Warren, finding he could not
lead the side he had been on before his arrival in Washington,
determined to lead the side he had earlier opposed. 14 Or
consistency might be thought essential to demonstrate Warren's
leadership role on the Supreme Court. Otherwise one could
suspect Warren of following rather than leading when he espoused positions taken on the Court by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge long before Warren's Supreme
Court post was even a gleam in Eisenhower's eye. Accepting
Emerson's observation, however, that a "foolish consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds, . . . [w]ith consistency a great

soul has simply nothing to do,"' 15 one wonders why White
strains to rebut allegations of Warren's inconsistency. After
all, if this book asserts nothing else, it asserts that Warren's
was a great soul.
This brings us to the third proposition that the book attempts to refute, "that Warren was not a legal technician and
that his jurisprudential views were largely derivative." White
proposes that "Warren was merely a different kind of legal
technician, unorthodox rather than inept, and that his theory
of judging, while uniquely his, was not without its own theoretical integrity" (p. 4). Here, indeed, we find ourselves in
shallow waters filled with huge boulders. White informs us
that Warren took his guidance to constitutional judgment neither from the text of the Constitution, nor from precedent, nor
14 See H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELiX FRANKFURTER (i981) (making a similar
argument with respect to Frankfurter).
is Emerson, SelfReliance, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 57 (1903).
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from legislation, nor even from reason. In sum, the book
depicts Warren imagining himself a figure invoked by Learned
Hand only in hyperbole - the Platonic Guardian.16
Lest I be accused of indulging in caricature, allow me to
use White's own words in describing what he defines as Warren's "jurisprudence":
Warren thus equated judicial lawmaking with neither the
dictates of reason, as embodied in established precedent or
doctrine, nor the demands imposed by an institutional theory
of the judge's role, nor the alleged "command" of the constitutional text, but rather with his own reconstruction of the
ethical structure of the Constitution. No other influential
judge on the Warren Court, or for that matter in the twentieth
century, adopted such a view. Several leading judges, such
as Holmes, Learned Hand, Frankfurter, and Harlan, were
institutionalists; Black was a textual determinist; Benjamin
Cardozo and Roger Traynor were creative disciples of reason.
The only other Supreme Court justice who approached Warren's jurisprudential posture was Frank Murphy, who never
achieved Warren's stature as a force on the Court or as a
public figure. Indeed, the same posture that invoked ridicule
in Murphy was the source of Warren's strength as a judge.
(P. 359) (footnotes omitted).

White recognizes the problems created by what he dubs Warren's "ethicism":
Warren's definition of judging as an exercise in ethical
choices raises two questions, each of which has received preliminary attention, and each of which is here sought to be
answered. The first involves the juristic consequences of his
stance: Did his approach produce a consistent and meaningful
jurisprudence? The second concerns the worth of Warren's
approach: Is it essential that it be held by a person of genuinely humane instincts? Anthony Lewis once said of Warren
that he "was the closest thing the United States has had to a
Platonic Guardian, dispensing law from a throne without any
sensed limits of power except what was seen as the good of
society. Fortunately he was a decent, humane, honorable,
16

For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If
they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I
have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs. Of
course I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote determined
anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the
sense that we are all engaged in a common venture. If you retort that a sheep
in the flock may feel something like it; I reply, following Saint Francis, "My
brother, the Sheep."
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958).
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democratic Guardian." Is Lewis right in suggesting that the
posture of an ethicist is fatally dependent on the ethicist's own
character? (P. 359) (footnote omitted).
White knows the answer. He has already informed us that
"Warren's activist stance as a judge can be said to have originated in his visceral reactions to two experiences on the Court
in the 1950s" (p. 187). The question whether a structure of
constitutional jurisprudence can be erected on a foundation of
human viscera seems to carry its own answer. Many a primitive society based its judgments on the examination of animal
entrails. None left behind a "jurisprudence." Only the abandonment of the rule of law can make of Warren's example a
guide to judicial behavior. And White acknowledges this
point:
Thus when one compares Warren's approach with that of
one, such as that of Hugo Black, which reached comparable
results in countless cases, one finds a vulnerability in Warren's
perspective that Black's avoids....
...
[W]hen Black is done, there is more than an aggregate
of his ethical premises - there is a doctrinally consistent, if
perhaps analytically flawed, body of constitutional jurisprudence. In contrast, when one divorces Warren's opinions from
their ethical premises, they evaporate. No overreaching doctrinal unity binds them; they are individual examples of beliefs
leading to judgments. One may applaud the results, embrace
the premises, and admire the instincts of the man, but one
can never divorce Earl Warren's opinions from Earl Warren
and treat them as anonymous contributions to constitutional
literature. (Pp. 366-67).
Perhaps even White gets carried away in praising or damning Warren's constitutional opinions. Apparently Warren himself sometimes recognized the need for legal reasoning. According to White, he also recognized his own inability to
supply it. "Brennan was Warren's judicial technician. He was
capable, in cases such as Baker v. Carr, or New York Times
v. Sullivan, of supplying doctrinal rationales for decisions in
which Warren strongly believed" (p. 185). To invoke again
the voice of Warren's devil, Frankfurter: "Chief Justices of the
United States are rarer than Presidents. A Chief Justice cannot
escape history."' 17 My gut reaction to the White book is that
the Warren Court may not "escape history," but that Warren
may.

17

Frankfurter, Chief Justice Stone, in
supra note 7, at 442.

COURT,

FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME

